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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HO\\. .AR-D F. CORAY. Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of William
Frank Lucus, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 7382

SOUTHER-N PACIFIC COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defenda;nt amd Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT O.F THE CASE
A.

PRELIMINARY STATEl\1:ENT

Parties will be designated as in the trial court.
All italics are added.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Frank Lucus, an employee of defendant, 39
yearsSponsored
of age
at the time of his death, was fatally injured
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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while engaged in the performance of his duty as a signal
n1aintainer on the main line track of respondent at a
point approximately 3600 feet east of the east switch at
L~emay, in Box Elder County, Utah, on the afternoon of
the 24th ·day of May, 1944. Howard F. Coray, ancillary
administrator, filed suit in the District Court of Weber
County, Utah. 'This. case has been twice tried. The first
trial resulted in a directed verdict of no cause of action
in favor of defendant. Thereafter, the case was appealed
to this Court which affirmd the judgment of the lower
court at ________ , Utah ________ , 185 P. ( 2d) 963. The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari and revers·ed the decision of this Court and remanded the case
for a new trial, 69 !s.. Ct. 275 (Jan. 3, 1949). The case
came on again for the second trial on th·e 25th day of
May, 1949. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of
action and judgment was entered accordingly (Tr. 145).
D·ef.endant was charged with operating its eastbound
freight train, First 582, consisting of 82 freight cars, a
caboose and an engine, in violation of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act, Sections 1, ·8, 9, 51 and 53 of Title 45
U. S. C. A., in that it hauled and permitt~d to be hauled
and used in interstate commerce PFE Car No. 29435 at
a time when the threads on the triple valve were so badly
worn that the triple union nut became disconnected from
the triple valv·e, allowing the air in the brake line to
escape to the atmosphere, thus causing the automatic
air brakes on each car in the train to be set at once in
emergency, bringing the moving train to an unexpected,
undesired, abrup·t and sudden stop; that seconds after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the stop the track car, upon which deceased wa.s riding,
Yiolently collided "'"i th the rear end of the train, causing
his death.
There \Yas no particular conflict in the testimony.
The evidence conclusively demonstrated that the defendant was guilty of the charged violation of the Safety
Appliance Act, and it was stipulated that the train
stopped because the triple union nut became disconnected
from the triple valve · on PFE Car 29435 due to the
threads on the triple valve being worn (Tr. 41).
The Conductor, Darrel E. Jorgensen, was under
orders to take the train onto the siding east of NewfoUJidland, and at the time of the accident he was making a
run for that siding (Tr. 35-37).
There was no doubt about the stop being an undesired, quick action stop, and that it was unexpected
by the train crew and all concerned in the operation of
the train (Tr. 37, 38).
When Mr. Jorgensen first saw the track car upon
which deceased was riding he thought it was about 500
feet from the rear end of hi.s train (Tr. 38-40).
Alvin 0. Lynch was riding on the track car with
deceased at the time of the collision. He was being taken
over the signal maintainer's territory by Lucus for the
purpose of acquainting him with the signal maintainer's
job at L·emay. Lynch testified that the track in the vicinity of the accident ran east and west and that Lucus
was sitting on the north side of the track car, facing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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north, and that he, Lynch, was sitting on the .south side
of the track car, facing south (Tr. 20). That immediately prior to the accident he, Lynch, was looking to the
west watching a signal located at the east end of Lemay
(Tr. 21).
Mr. Jorgensen testified that both Lucus and Lynch
were looking to the west as the track car, on which they
were riding, approached the rear of the stalled train
(Tr. 45).
Lynch testified that the track car was not going at
any excessive r,ate of speed and in his opinion wa.s proceeding at between 10 and 25 miles per hour (Tr. 22).
All of the witnesses were of the opinion that the
collision occurred within a very few seconds of the time
the train came to a stop.
The only person qualifying as a dependent heir of
deceased was Edith B. Lucus, wife of Frank Lucus. Deceased and Mr.s. Lucus were married December 26, 1936
(Tr. 77). During all hut the last year or two immediately
preceding the death of Lucus they resided at Los Angeles, California~ Both deceased and Mrs. Lucus were
constantly employed during their married life. Deceased's earnings while in California ranged from $40.00
to $50.00 per week (Tr. 79). From his earnings deceased
contributed between $50.00 and $75.00 :p·er month to the
support of Mrs. Lucus until 1941 when hi.s contribution
became less (Tr. 82). In 1941 his contribution fell to
$25.00 to $30.00 per month.
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In . .-\ugust, 19-±2, Lucus began an action for divorce
(Tr. 84). ~Irs. Lucus filed a counter action for separate
n1aintenance (Tr. 85-86). In January, 1943, the matter
"·as heard and Lucus \Vas ordered to pay $10.00 per week
for the support of his wife (Tr. 87), starting vvith February 1, 1943 ( Tr. 88). No further court proceedings
'\vere had, and Mrs. Lucus never savv nor heard from
Lucus again during his lifetime (Tr. 88). Mrs. Lucus
made a search of available sources of information concerning Lucus' vvhereabouts, but was unable to locate
him. She remained at home and awaited his return,
being sure that he would come back (Tr. 88-91).
The court, over plaintiff's objection, allowed a certified copy of Mrs. Lucus' cross-complaint for separate
maintenance to be introduced in evidence as Exhibit "2 ".
Said exhibit contained allegations that Lucus had not
supported Mrs. Lucus for over a year; that Lucus
squandered his money on liquor, and drank to excess,
and had refused to return to live with Mrs. Lucus even
though she begged him to return and give up his bad
habits and disreputable friends.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRO·RS
1.

The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 16.

2. The Court erred in allowing the introduction of
Exhibit "3 ", and giving Instruction No. 10.
3. The Court erred in refusing plaintiff's requested
Instruction
No. 4.
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4.

The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 9.

5. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 11.
6. The Court erred in overruling plain tiff's motion
for new trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COURT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT IF DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A COM·PLETE
BAR TO RECOVERY. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3).

POINT II.
THE COURT'S REFUSAL AND F AlLURE TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AND
INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID IN INSTRUCTION
NO. 9 ·CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR (Assignment
of Errors 4 and 5).

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COURT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT IF DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NE~GLIGENCE HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A COMPLETE
BAR TO RECOVER.Y. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3).

Section 53, Title 45,
follows:

U.S.~C.A.,

provides in part -as
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"* * * That no such e1nployee \Yho n1ay be
injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty
of contributory negligence in any case where
the violation by such common carrier of any
statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.''
Sections 1, 8, and 9 of Title 45 U.S.C.A., are all
statutes enacted for the safety of employees and they
are the sections of the Code which defendant is charged
with violating and which the court instructed the jury
the defendant had violated (Instruction No. 5, J.R. 210).
Yet, contrary to the provisions of ~section 53 and the
fact that defendant had violated Sections 1, 8,_ and 9
of Title 45 as matter of law, His Honor instructed the
jury in Instruction No. 16 as follows (J.R. 210):
''You are instructed that where an employee
has two ways of performing an act in the course
of his employment, the one safe and the other
dangerous, he owes a positive duty to the employer to pursue the safe method, and any departure from the p'ath of safety will prevent
his recovery' if he is injured. ''
The plain me~ning of this i~struction could only be that
any negligence on the_ part of dec~ased would completely
bar any recovery in this action. ~- The court then went
on to instruct the jury as follows::'

'' * * *

Therefo~e,

if you find that William
Frank Lucus could hav-e in·~nipulated said. motor
car with equal ease .from a position where he
could have· obs~:r;ved the freight train proceeding
ahead of ·him, rather than ··a position with
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his back towards the freight train, but that he
did not do so but manipulated said motor car
with his back to the freight train, and if you find
that manipulating said motor car with his back
to the freight train was not as safe as manipulating said motor car facing the freight train and
that William Frank Lucus thus chose an unsafe
pooition, when a safe position was equally available to him, then William Frank Lucus, the deceased, was guilty of negligence, and if such
negligence, if you so find, was the sole proximate
cause of deceased's injuries and death, then your
verdict must be for the defendant 'no cause of
action.' ''
This instruction was not requested by defendant
or plaintiff, but was given by the court on his own initiative.
Plaintiff is unable to discover any case or statutory
law which would justify an instruction that an employee
muot at all times choose the safest method of :performing
his work or be charge with negligence as a matter of law.
In addition to the quoted instruction the court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 10 (J.R. 210) that
the railroad company ''ha.s the legal right to make such
rules and regulations for the conduct of its employees
• * * and all employees while engaged in such service
with a knowledge of such rules are exp,ected to follow
and obey them.'' This instruction was given for the
purpose of aiding the jury in its use of defendant's
Exhibit "3." Defendant's Exhibit "3'' was allowed in
the evidence over plaintiff's strenuous ohjection ( Tr.
135).
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The exhibit consisted of three rules taken from the
railroad company's Rule Book. Rule 1112 dealt with
track cars following moving trains, and stated (Tr. 136):
'·,,..hen following moving trains, track cars
must remain not less than 400 feet to the rear
of .same, * * * ' '
Rule 1119 is a cautionary rule concerning the speeds
at which track cars may be operated, and states ('Tr.
137):
''Track cars must not under any circumstances be operated at a speed in excess of 15
miles per hour, nor over road crossings at speed
in excess of 4 miles per hour; and after dark or
through stormy or foggy weather when visibility
is p·oor, .speed shall be reduced to the absolute
minimum consistent with safety. A constant and
vigilant look-out must be maintained and speed
controlled approaching interlocked derails and
switches or those operated by remote control, so
that stop can be made to avoid accident in the
event the route is unexpectedly changed. Before
rounding sharp curves or through tunnels and
snowsheds where view is obscured, flagmen must
be sent ahead for protection, if it cannot otherwise
be positively determined that way is clear."
Rule 1120 was the third railroad rule which defendant was allowed to introduce into the evidence, and as
far as material the rule provides as follows (Tr. 137):

"* * * and further that lineups obtained
from train dispatcher cannot always be depended
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upon by reason of conditions unexpectedly changing in the meantime.''
The introduction of the rules and Instruction No.
10 when taken together with Instruction No. 16, could
have but one purpose, that being to lead the jury to
believe that a disobedience of the railroad company's
rules and regulations by Frank Lucus would be a ''departure from the ·path of safety'' and would he a har
to any recovery in this action.
Instruction No. 16, Instruction No. 10 and the introduction of Exhibit '' 3'' will be discussed together for
they are all errors which go to the basic proposition that
the Court instructed the jury that negligence on the part
of Frank Lucus was a bar to his administrator's action.
The authorities concerning these points will be
discussed in the following order: the Supreme Court
of the United States cases, other federal authorities,
state decisions.
The United States Supreme Court in Grand Trwnk
Western RaJihoay Co. v. Lindsay, 2·33 U.S. 42, 34 S. Ct.
581, 582, 58 L. Ed. 838, specifically disapproved a trial
court'·s instruction containing somewhat similar language. In the Lim.dsay case the plaintiff went between
two cars where a defective coupler had failed to perform
its function. The trial court in instructing the jury
gave the following instructions:
" 'You are further instructed that if you
believe from the pre-ponderance of the evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the plaintiff gave a 'come-ahead' sig11al to
the s"~itchman or engineer, -one or both-and
after that \vent betw··een the cars and wa.s injured,
then you have a right to consider whether the
giving of the 'come-ahead' signal by the plaintiff
\Vas the proximate cause of the injury as dis-'
tinguished from the condition of the coupler, and
if you find that, under the circumstances, the
'come-ahead' signal "\Vas the proximate cause of
the injury, then your verdict must be for the
defendant.
'' 'You are also instructed that where there is
a safe and a dangerous way of doing an act, and
the servant uses a dangerous way and is injured
thereby, he is charged with negligence on his p~art
and may not recover.'''
At a later point in its instructions the court -atated:
" 'If, under . the employers' liability act,
plaintiff's negligence, contributing with defendant's negligence to the production of the injury,
does not defeat the cause of action, but only lessens the damages, and if the cause of action is
established by ·showing that the injury resulted
'in whole or in part' from defendant's negligence, the statute would be nullified by calling
plaintiff's act the proximate cause and then defeating him, when he could not be defeated by
calling his act contributory negligence. For his
act was the same act, by whatever name it be
called. It is only when plain tiff's act is the sole
cause-when defendant's act is no ·part of the
causation-.that defendant is free from liability
under
theLawact.
'' for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library.' Funding
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The evidence indicated that the jury might find
that the plaintiff had given a come-ahead signal and
after the come-ahead signal, walked between the cars
where the defective coupler was located. There was other
evidence to the effect that the come-ahead signal was
from some lantern oth'er than plaintiff's. The Supreme
Court in passing on the court's instructions, stated:

'' * * * But having ·regard to the state of the
proof as to the defect in the coupling mechanism,
its failure to automatically work by impact after
several efforts to bring about that result, all of
which preceded the act of the switchman in going
between the cars, in the view most favorable
to the railroad, the case was one of concurring
negligence; that is, was one where the injury
complained of was caused both by the failure
of the railway company to comply with the safety
appliance act and by the contributing negligence
of the switchman in going between the cars.
Under this condition of things, it is manifest
that the charge of the court was greatly more
favorable to the defendant company than was
authorized by the statute for the following reasons: Although by the 3d section of the employers' liability act a recovery is not prevented
in a case of contributory negligence, since the
statute substitutes for it a system of comparative
negligence, whereby the damages are to be diminished in the ·proportion which his negligence
bears to the combined negligence of himself and
the carrier,-in other words, the carrier is to be
exonerated from a proportional part of the damages corresponding to the amount of negligence
attributable to the employee (Norfolk & W. R.
Co. v. Earnest, 22'9 U.S. 114, 122, 57 L. ed. 1096,
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1101, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. G3±) ,-nevertheless, under
the tern1s of a proviso to the section, contributory
negligence on the part of the employee does not
operate even to diminish the recovery where the
injury has been occasioned in part by the failure
of the carrier to comply with the exactions of an
act of Congress enacted to promote the safety of
employees. In that contingency the statute abolishes the defense of contributory negligence, not
only as a bar to recovery, but for all purposes.''

The Lindsay case, of course, was authority for the
later decision of the Sup·reme Court of the United States
in Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co. v. C·ampbell,
241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125. The Campbell
case concerned a railroad engineer who took his train
out onto a single track line at a time when a regular train
was approaching on the same track. After proceeding
some little distance he observed the regular train coming toward him. He applied the brakes, they failed to
work and a collision resulted. At the trial a jury specifically found that Campbell had disobeyed a direct order
to him. They also rendered a general verdict on his behalf finding that the defective brakes were the p~roximate
cause of the collision an·d injury to Campbell.
·The railroad in the ·Campbell case argued that the
disobedience of orders on the part of Campbell took
him outside the class of employees for whose protection
the Safety Appliance Act was passed and that because
of his disobedience he departed from the course of his
employment. The court, in affirming the general verdict for Campbell, set forth in the following language
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the basic principles governing his conduct in relation
to the railroad company's violation of the Safety Appliance Act :
''Upon the whole case, we have no difficulty
in sustaining his right of action under the employers' liability act. That act (Sec. 1, 35 Stat.
at L. 65, chap. 149, Cornp. Stat. 1913, Sec. 8657)
imposes a liability for injury to an employee
'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, . . . . or other equiprnent.' As
was held in San Antonio & A. Pass. R. Co. v.
Wagner, decided June 5, 1916, 241 U.S. 476, 60
L. ed. --------, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep·. 62·6, a violation of
the safety appliance act is 'negligence' within the
meaning of the liability act. And by the proviso
to Sec. 3 of the latter act, no employee injured
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where a violation
of the ·safety appliance act 'contributed to the
injury or death of such employee.' It is too plain
for argument that under this legislation the violation of the safety appliance act need not be the
sole efficient cause, in order that an action may
lie. The circuit court of appeals (133 C.C.A.
370, 217 Fed. 524) held that the element of
proximate cause is eliminated where concurring
acts of the employer and ·employee contribute to
the injury or death of the employee. We agree
with this, except that we find it unnecessary to
say the effect of the ·statute is wholly to eliminate
the question of proximate cause. But where, as
in thi.s case, plaintiff's contributory negligence
and defendant's violation of a provision of the
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safety appliance act are concurring proximate
causes, it is plain that the employers' liability
act requires the former to be disregarded.''
Justice l\IcReynolds, following the same line of
thought and authority in Chicago Gre>at Western R. ·Co.
v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 is. Ct. 303, 304, 69 L. Ed.
614, reached a similar result dealing with the following
facts quoted from his decision :
"While the freight train upon which Ring
served as brakeman was upon the main line at
Budd, Iowa, a drawbar pulled out of a car. Thereupon the crew chained this car to the one immediately ahead. The engine pulled the whole train
onto the adjacent siding, which lies on a gentle'
grade, and stop·ped. The intention was to detach the damaged car and leave it there. The plan
was to cut off the engine, bring it around back
of the train, remove the rear portion, couple this
to the forward portion and move on. Acting
under the conductor'a direction, Ring asked the
head brakeman to tell the engineer to proceed,
and then, without the knowledge of either of the
others, he and the conductor went between the
crippled car and the next one in order to disengage the connecting chain. While they were working there the engineer cut off the engine, the car
ran slowly down the grade, and Ring, caught by
the chain, suffered fa tal injuries.
''A rule of the company provided that employees slJ.ould advise the engineer when they
were going between or under cars and must know
that he understood their purpose before they put
themselves in any dangerous ·position. Ring gave
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no such warning, although familiar with the rule
and with the grade upon which the train stood.
"Petitioner insists: (1) The facts do not
bring the case within the :safety Appliance Act
since the car had come to rest on the side track
and had ceased to be 'used,' within the meaning
of the statute. (2) The defective drawbar did
not .proximately contribute to the injury. ( 3) The
violation of the rule by Ring constituted negligence subsequent to and independent of the question of a defective safety appliance and was
a proximate cause of the injury.''
In discussing the effect of the violation of a Safety
Rule by Ring the Justice uses the following language:
''The things shown to have been done by the
deceased certainly amount to no more than contributory negJigence or assumption of the risk,
and both of these are removed from consideration
by the Liability Act. When injured he was 'within the class of persons for whose benefit the Safety
Appliance Acts required that the car be equipped
with automatic couplers and drawbars of standard height. * * * His injury was within the evil
against which the provisions for such appliances
are directed.' St. Louis & San Francisco R. R.
Co. v. Cona·rty, supra. He went into the dangerous place because the equipment of the car which
it was necessary to detach did not meet the
statutory requirements especially intended to protect men in his position.
''We find no material error in the judgment
below, and it is
' 'Affirmed. ' '
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The derisions of the Supreme Court cited and quoted
fron1 herein have been construed and used by the various circuit courts in a variety of railroad accident
cases.
Sc·rinz o v. Central R. R. of New Jersey et al., 138
F. (2d) 761, 762, concerned a safety rule promulgated
b:"'" the railroad company which prohibited employees
from going between cars where the coupling device was
defective. The evidence indicated that the deceased,
Murray,· had entered in between two moving cars while
attempting to use a defective cutting lever which was a
part of a coupling mechanism. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the railroad company cited as
error an instruction of the court to disregard the safety
rule. The circuit court in ·dealing with this action on the
part of the trial court stated:

''The defendants put in evidence their Safety
Rule 203 of which Murray had a copy. This reads
as follows: 'Rule 203. In coupling or uncoupling
cars the cutting levers must be used. If cutting
lever or coupling device is inoperative, cars, locomotives or motors must be stopped, and slack permitted to run in or out before any attemp~t is
made to adjust coupling device.'
''The court charged that violation of the
safety rules was not an issue in the case and they
were not to be considered by the jury. Counsel
for the defendants took an exception and asked
the court 'in furtherance of that situation to
charge the jury that if the jury were to find that
the violation of those rules which are in evidence
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then their verdict "\vould be f'Or the defendants.'
This request was properly denied since contributory negligence or assumption of risk are no
defense if a violation of the Safety Appliance .Act
contributes to the injury or death. 45 U.S.C ..A.
Sees. 53, 54; Chicago, G. W. R. Co. v. Schendel,
267 U.S. 287, 292, 45 S. Ct. 303, 69 L. Ed. 614. ''

Palum v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 165 F. (2d) 3, 6,
a decision written by Augustus N. Hand, deals with the
failure on the part of a railroad employee to keep, a
lookout in the direction in which his train was moving,
and also a failure on the part of the emp·loyee to obey
an unwritten safety rule which required a fireman to
notify the engineer before leaving the cab while the train
was in motion. The argument by the railroad comp·any
was that plaintiff's disobedience of the rule and his failure to observe the low bridge in time to prevent being
hit by it was the ·sole cause of his injury. Justice Hand
in his opinion stated as follows:

"=t

* What the plaintiff seems to have
done wa.s to have failed to be watchful enough
for obstacles as well as to have forgotten to notify
the engineer that he was going to leave the cab.
We think the inadvertent neglect to observe the
rule, while probably an act of contributory negligence to be considered by the jury in reduction
of his damages, was not a bar to his claim.''
*

Philadelphia & R. Ry. ·Co. v . .Auc·he:nbaah, 16 F. (2d)
550, 551, concerned an accident wherein a brakeman was
crushed between two cars after attempting to effect
a coupling when the automatic coupler did not work
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on impact. The railroad company offered to prove that
one of its rules had been disobeyed by the plaintiff in
that he had failed to leave his lantern outside on the
.e:Tound where it would be in view of the members of his
crew while he went between the cars, and that this
failure on his part was the proximate and sole cause
of plaintiff's injury. The trial court then instructed
the jury that .if they found there was a violation of the
Safety Appliance Act liability would attach to the defendant without regard to the negligence on the part
of plaintiff. The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, in
affirming the trial court's ruling, stated:
"The plaintiff in the instant case went between the cars to p·repare for another attempt
to couple only becaus·e the couplers did not at first
couple automatically by impact, that is, 'Because
the equipment of the car which it was necessary
to (couple) did not meet the statutory requirements especially intended to protect him in his
position.' Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. :Schendel,
supra; Tennesse A. & G. R. R. Co. v. Drake (C.
C. A.) 276 F. 393. If his act amounted to negligence it was no more than contributory negligence which was removed from consideration by
the Act. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel,
supra; Auchenbach v. P. & R. R. Co., supra. Moreover, it is the law that a violation of the Act need
not be the sole efficient cause in order that an
action may lie. ·so also the element of proximate
cause is eliminated where concurrent acts of the
employer and employee ·contribute to the injury.
S·pokane & Island E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S.
497, 510, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125; Pless v.
New
Central
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179 N.Y.S. 578, Affir1ned, 232 N.Y. 523, 134 N.E.
555. In this situation, where there was nothing to
show that the plaintiff's contributory negligence,
if any, was other than negligence concurrent with
that of the defendant, it follows that an issue of
the plaintiff's contributory negligence with its
underlying issue of proximate cause was eliminated from the case and, in consequence, evidence
to prove it was properly rejected. Southern R.
R. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 72·5, 34 S. Ct. 897,
58 L. Ed. 1564; Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Otos,
239 u.s. 349, 36 ~s. ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322; T. & P.
R. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36· S. Ct. 482,
60 L. Ed. 874; Atlantic City R .. R .. Co. v. Parker,
242 U.S. 56, 37 S. Ct. 69, 61 L. Ed. 150; Union
Pacific R .. R. Co. v. Huxoll, 245 U.S. 535, 38 S.
Ct. 187, 62 L. Ed. 455. ''
The most recent circuit court decision in point here
is McCa.rthy v. Pe.nnsylvania R. Co., 156 F. (2d) 877,
881, (cert. den. 329 u.~s. 812, 6·7 S. Ct. 635, 91 L. Ed. 69'3),
wherein Judge Minton, President Truman's nominee to
the Sup:reme Court of the United States, authored the
court's opinion. McCarthy, the engineer, operated his
engine from Indiana Harbor, Indiana, into Chicago, Ill.,
after knowing that the locomotive had developed a hot
box. At Whiting, Indiana the conductor gave McCarthy
a signal to go to the next station at Colehour, about
one mile away, and get another engine. McCarthy ignored this ·signal. Several other employees. between
Whiting and Chicago gave McCarthy a hot bo~ signal.
At Englewood the conductor again talked to McCarthy
and suggested that he get another engine at defendant's
shop at 59th Street in Chicago, but McCarthy refused
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and continued toward the Union Station in Chicago .
.A.t 22nd Street another hot box signal was given McCarthy, which he ignored, and after traveling a short
distance the pony truck on the locomotive broke, the
engine turned over and McCarthy was killed. In discussing the case Judge Minton stated:
''The defendant's answer tendered the issue
that the sole proximate cause ·of the accident wa.s
the fact that the decedent continued to use the
locomotive after he knew of its defective condition
and failed to report it as was his duty under the
rules. These acts constituted no defense. ·The
decedent's acts were all concurring acts with the
act of the defendant in violation of the statute,
and were either acts of contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk of known danger, from
both of which, as we have pointed out, the decedent had been relieved by the statute. '* * * But
where, as in this case, plaintiff's contributory
negligence and defendant's violation of a provision of the saf·ety appliance act are concurring
proximate causes, it is plain that the employers'
liability act requires the former to be disregarded.' Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v.
Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 510, H6 S. Ct. 683, 689,
60 L. Ed. 1125. ~s.ee also Louisville & Nashville
Co. v. Wene, 7 Cir., 202 F. 887, 892.
''The court further instructed the jury: 'On
the other hand, (if you find) that the railroad
company, knew at all times the things required
of it by law, and that it did not violate the law
requiring the use of engines in safe condition,
even if you find the Defendant was negligent and
didby thenot
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engines in good condition, but that such failure to
comply with the law was not the cause of the
injury to and death of the decedent, but that such
injury and death were caused solely by his own
acts independently of any negligence on the part
of the Defendant, it would be your duty to find
for the Defendant. But, as I have stated, such
acts of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff,
if you find such acts of negligence, merely contributed to and were not the sole cause of his
death, you should find for the Plaintiff.'
"This instruction is improper, first because it
told the jury in effect that the defendant's liability for violation of the statute depended upon
the said violation being the cause of the decedent's death, whereas the statute provides that
the defendant shall be liable if the violation
caused 'in whole or in part' th·e death of the decedent. 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51; Spokane & Inland
Empire R. Co. v. Campbell, supra. Secondly,
the instruction is imp·rop,er because it told the
jury that the plaintiff could not recove.r if his
decedent was guilty of acts of negligence that
solely caused his. death. As an abstract proposition of law, that is correct, hut there was no evidence of any independent acts of negligence by
the decedent that were the sole cause of the acci·dent and his death. The court had instructed on
a proposition of law about which there was no
evidence.
''This was bound to confuse and mislead the
jury into believing that the concurring acts of
the decedent in continuing to use the defective
locomotive after he knew it was defective, and
not reporting it, might be considered as acts of
negligence, for which the decedent might be
charged with sole liability for the accident. The
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giving of such instruction under such circumstances "'"as error. Insurance Co. v. Baring, 20
Wall. 159, 87 U.S. 159, 162, 22 L. Ed. 225; United
States v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 61 U.S. 252, 254,
15 L. Ed. 900; Adan1s v. Vanderbeck, 148 Ind.
92 . 97, 45 N.E. 645, 47 N,.E. 24, 62 Am. St. Re-p.
497; Fletcher Bros. Co. v. Hyde, 36 Ind. App.
96, 75 N.E. 9; 64 Corpus Juris, Sec. 657; 53
American Juris prudence, Section 579-580, and
numerous cases cited.
''The judgment is reversed, and the District
Court is directed to grant a new trial.''
The language which Judge Minton nsea in the Me
Carthy case and his line of reasoning is es'pecially applicable in the present situation.
The court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 16,
as follows ( J .R. 210) :

'' * * • then William Frank Lucus, the deceased, was guilty of negligence, and if such negligence, if you so find, was the sole proximate
cause of deceased's injuries and death, then your
verdict must be for the defendant 'no cause of
action.' ''
There is, of course, no evidence of any indepen·dent
act of negligence by the decedent, William Frank Lucus,
and if the instruction in the M cOarthy case concerning
sole cause was an abstract proposition of law about
which there was no evidence, then, of course, the court's
instruction in the present case is also an abstract proposition of law about which there is no evidence. Neither
the Utah State Supreme Court nor the United States
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Supreme Court in the two decisions which have been
written conceived or discussed the actions of Lucus as
being independent intervening acts.
It seems obvious that Instruction No. 16 was bound
to confuse and mislead the jury into believing that
the acts of negligence on the part of decedent could be
the sole cause of his death.
The United States 'Supreme Court in its decision in
the case at bar pointed out that this court discussed
the causes of the death of Lucus by resort to dilectical
subleties distinguishing between what was a philosophical cause and a legal cause. The decision then stated:
''The language selected by Congress to fix
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct.
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction
of dialectical subleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their employees'
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from defectiv-e appliances such as· were here maintained.
45 U.S.C. 51. And to make its purpose crystal
clear, Congress has also p-rovided that 'no such
employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case' where a
violation of the 'Safety Appliance Act, such as
the one here, 'contributed to the . . . death of
such employee.' 45 U.S.C. 53. Congress has thus
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety
obligations upon railroads and has commanded
that if a breach of these obligations con tributes
in part to an employee's death, the railroad must
pay damages. These air-brakes we're defective;
for this reason alone the train suddenly and unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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expectedly stopped; a motor track car following
at about the same rate of speed and ·operated by
an employee looking in another direction crashed
into the train; all of these circumstances were
inseparably related to one another in time and
space. The jury could have found that decedent's
death resulted from any or all of the foregoing
circumstances.''
Using the Supreme Court of the United States decision as a foundation, p;laintiff in his requested Instruction No-. 4 requested that the court instruct the jury
as follows ( J.R. 208):
''You are instructed that under the provisions
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if a violation
of such act by a common carrier by rail in interstate commerce contributes to the death of one
its employees th·en such employee cannot be held
to have been guilty of contributory negligence.
''In this connection if you find from a preponderance of· the evidence that the violation of
the Federal Safety Appliance Act mentioned in
Instruction No. ________ (here insert number which
corresponds to plaintiff's Requested Instruction
No. 3) contributed to the death of William Frank
Lucus then you are instructed that the s-aid William Frank Lucus cannot be found or considered
guilty of contributory negligence, and you must,
in arriving at your verdict, entirely disregar:d
the manner in which he drove and operated the
motorcar regardless of whether or not the manner
in which he drove or operated constitutedafailure
on his part to exercise ordinary care, and your
verdict should be for plaintiff even though his
conduct contributed to cause his own death.''
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The first paragraph only of this request was given.
This Court will, of course, notice that the Supreme
Court of the United States does not use the words
''proximate cause'' but state a, as did Instruction No.
4, that "where a violation of the Safety Appliance
Act, such as the one here, 'contributed to the death
of such employee.' '' Could there be any possible doubt
that the unexpected, sudden stop of the freight train
contributed to cau.se Lucus' death~
Can the immovable object be casually eliminated
from the explosion resulting from a meeting with the
irresistable force?
The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court became the law of this case. The trial court's ·refusal
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 4 was a
direct disregard of that opinion depriving plaintiff of
the rights which the Supreme Court declared were due
him and prejudicially depriving him of his rights under
the Safety Appliance and Federal Employers' Liability
Acts.
The state authorities construing and following the
Supreme Court of the United 'States and other federal
cases are numerous. The factual ·situations, of course,
are varied in many ways. We cite and discuss only a
few of the more pertinent cases.
In Leet v. Union Bacifiic R. Co., 60 Cal. App. (2d).
814, 142 P. (2d) 37, 40, the plaintiff brought an action for
wrongful death basing her suit upon a violation by the
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defendant of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, requiring all cars used in interstate commerce to be
equipped with efficient hand brakes. The defendant
sought to introduce a rule which was excluded by the
trial court. Mter referring to Tiller v. AtZarntic Coast
Li:ne R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 143 A.L.R.
967, the court stated:
'' Since the negligence of the defendant in
sending out a car with its brake rigging in a defec..
tive condition was concededly established, it fol ..
lows that defendant may not be relieved from the
consequences of its neglect by the claim that plaintiff assumed the risk of such negligence.
"Rule 26, which was excluded from the evidence reads· as follows: 'When emergency repair
work is to be done under or about the cars in a
train and a blue signal is not available, the ·engineman and fireman must be notified and pro. tection must be given those engaged in making the
repairs.'
''In view of the amendment to section 54 and
of the Tiller decision rule 26 was immaterial to
the issues and was properly rejected. Chicago,
etc., Co. v. Schendel, supra. If there was no
assumed risk or contributory negligence to be attributed to the brakeman, no amount of rules
adopted by defendant could alter the law if the
company was itself negligent.'' .
In Aly v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo.
1116, 119 S.W. (2d) 863 (1938), action was brought for
personal
sustained
byprovided
plaintiff.
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was based on a violation of the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 22, one of the acts enacted by Congress to promote the ·.safety of railroad employees. Plaintiff had sought to mount a moving engine
and in stepping on a footboard, it gave way causing
him to fall and lose both legs. The engine was coming
toward him at the time he attempted to mount it. The
defendant sought to introduce a rule of the company
forbidding switchmen to board engines coming toward
them. The trial court's refusal to admit the rule was.
upheld by the Appellate Court, and in discu.s·.sing the
matter, the court stated:
"A'ppellant offered to introduce in evidence
a rule of the company which forbade switchmen
to board engines coming toward them. The trial
court refused to permit this rule to be introduced
in evidence. Appellant has cited the case of
Frese v. Chicago, B. & 0·. R. Co., 26·3 U. S. 1, 44
S. Ct. 1, 58 L. Ed. 131. In that case a statute- of
Illinois made it the duty of a locomotive engineer
to stop his train at a c.rossing of another railroad
and to positively ascertain that the way was clear
before passing over the crossing. This the engineer failed to do and lost his life in a collision
which followed. The court held that a violation of
the statutory duty on the part of the engineer
was the sole cause of the injury. Without 'deciding whether a violation of a rule of the company is a parity with a violation of a state statute,
there is on this distinction : In the Frese Case
the plaintiff relied upon the negligence of the
fireman in failing to perform a duty which the
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statute imposed upon the engineer. In the case
before us plaintiff 'vas relying upon a defective
appliance. So even if plaintiff violated a rule,
that would be only a contributing cause and not
the sole cause. In Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v.
Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, ·60 L·. Ed.
1125, the plaintiff had violated an order, and was
injured through a defective air hose which caused
a collision. In 241 U.S. 497, loc, cit. 508, 36 is. Ct.
689, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the Court said in speaking
of the violation of the order: 'In its legal effect
this was nothing more than negligence on his
part.' The court further said in the concluding
part of the opinion : 'But where, as in this case,
plaintiff's contributory negligence and defendant'B violation of a provision of the safety appliance act are concurring proximate causes, it
is plain that the employers' liability act requires
the former to be disregarded.' In the case under
consideration the jury was explicitly instructed
that plaintiff could not recover unless the footboard slip·ped toward the drawbar and caused the
plaintiff to fall. A violation of the rule, therefore, could at most have been only contributory
negligence and not a defense. We must rule the
point against appellant."
In Jordan v.

E~as:t

St. Louis Co111necting Ry. Q;o.,

308 Mo. 31, 271 S.W. 997, the plaintiff brought suit under
the F·ederal Employers' Liability Act and based the
action upon a violation of the Federal'S.afety Appliance
Act relating to automatic couplers. Plaintiff kicked the
drawbar in order to align it for coupling, and his
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the defendant company prohibiting employees from kicking drawbars. The court stated:
''The next error assigned is the refusal of the
court to permit defendant to show that a rule
had been promulgated forbidding employees to
kick drawbars, and to show that the plaintiff had
knowledge of the existence of that rule. Upon
that Schendel v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co. (Minn.),
197 N. W. 744, and Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen.,
65 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, are cited. But it was
held otherwise in Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I.
Ry., 268 Mo. 31, 186 S. W. 1035. In that case, one
under the Safety Appliance Act, the question
came up upon a rule forbidding employees 'to
go between cars in motion to uncouple them.'
Following references to the circumstances under
which the question arose, the court ;said, loc, cit.
35 (186

s.w. 1037):

" 'Further, respondent's violation, if any of
appellant's rule was at most but evidence of contributory negligence; and in this case, the action
being founded upon violations of the applicable
Safety Appliance Act, contributory negligence
constitutes neither defense nor mitigation. (Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223, U.S. 1. c.
49, 50). There was no error in this ruling.'
'' 'In the first case cited by defendant, Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St.· P. Ry. Co., the question
at issue was one of 'exact obedience f~om an employee to a. foreman's direct command requiring
instant execution.' It was held that if the employee directly contrary to such command med·
died with. a defective appliance, his willful disobedience must be regarded as the sole cause of
his injury. But the court distinguished between a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
command of that sort and the issuance of general
standing orders or rules; the rule on the latter
being that of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S.
349, 36 S. Ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322. This assignment
must be ruled against defendant.''

In Ross v. New York ·C. & St. L. R. Co., 73 F. (2d)
187, 188, (1934, 6th Circuit), plaintiff claimed the right to
recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and the Boiler Inspection Act. The court charged the
jury that there was no liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but submitted the case upon
the Boiler Inspection Act. There was· a verdict for defendant and plaintiff ap·pealed. 'The chief error relie·d
upon was the admission over plaintiff's objection of
a company safety rule in evidence. The court stated:
''The petition charged violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and under that
enactment, section 53, title 45, U.S.C. ( 45 U.S.
C.A., Section 53), testimony hearing upon the
contributory negligence of the defendant is admissible in diminution of damages except where
the common carrier has violated any statute enacted for the safety of employees, thus contributing in whole or in part to the injury or death
of such employee. Kansas City Southern R. Co.
v. Jones, Adm'x, 241 U.'S:. 181, 36 S. Ct. 513,
60 L. Ed. 943.
''The testimony as to the existence, promulgation and violation of the rule was admissible
at the time it was received, for no violation of a
safety act had been shown and the case was still
being
heard
under
the provided
Federal
Employers'
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bility Act. When the court charged the jury that
no liability was imposed upon the defendant because of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
counsel for plaintiff should then have requested
that all testimony as to the existence, promulgation, and violation of the rule he excluded from
the record and that the jury be instructed to dia...
regard it. No such request was made.''
In Alab,am,a Great Sou,ther.n R. Co. v. Cornett, (Ala.)
106 So. 242, the plaintiff attempted to uncouple two cars,
but because of the defective condition of the couplers,
he failed and fell underneath the wheels. The defendant contended that there was no direct evidence as to the
cause of the injuries to the deceased beyond the undisputed · fact that he was run over by one of the cars.
Defendant contended that plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of the p·roof that the violation, if any,
of the Safety Appliance Act, proximately caused the
injuries. The court stated:
"Under the federal statutes entering into the
decision of this case, any misconduct of said intestate, being n9 more than contributory negligence, is. excluded as a defense in bar to a recovery by the terms of the Employers' Liability
Act ( 35 Stat. 66 (U.iS.. Comp. St. Sections 86578665) vol. 2, Roberts Fed. Liab. of Carriers, P.
· 1406, Section 863-868), and by those of the Safety
Appliance provisions, 27 Stat. 532 (U.S. Comp.
St. Section 8612:); Barnes' Fed. Code (1919), p·p.
1929, 1937, Section 8030, 8071; Roberts Fed. Liab.
of Carriers, p. 773, et seq. ; Ala. & V. R. Co. v.
Dennis, 128 Miss. 298, 91 So. 4. Pertinent observations of Mr. 'Justice Pitney are contained in San
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Antonio, etc., Co. v. ''Tagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36
S. Ct. 626, 60 L. Ed. 1110, 1117.
'·The common-law duty of due care is
changed to that of an absolute duty in resp·ects
indicated by Congress. A failure of a coupler
to "'"ork at any time 'vhen required or necessary
held to sustain a charge of negligence or failure
of statutory duty in the premises (Chicago, etc.,
Co. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317, 33 S. Ct. 840, 57 L.
Ed. 1204; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States,
220 U.S. 559, 31 S. Ct. 612, 55 L. Ed. 582; St.
L., etc., Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616,
52 L. Ed. 1061); that is to say, this prescribed and
required safety appliance must not only he provided, but duly maintained in condition for operation (L. & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 37
S. Ct. 456, 61 L. Ed. 931). When the statute is
so understood, the conduct of plaintiff's intestate
was immaterial, though in contravention to positive rules or instructions by defendant. Noel v.
Q. 0. & K. C. R. Co. (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 787.
There was no error in the court's rulings and
refusal of charges as to the rules of defendant as
affecting intestate's conduct in disregard of said
rules and defendant'·s liability for injury inflicted
while so disregarding the rules. Texas & P. R.
Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.. 33, 39, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60
L. Ed. 874,877. ''
In the case of Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. D'Av·ignon (Ga.), 153 S. 'E. 96',; the court held that in a ·suit ·~bY,
an employee for personal injury based upon an alleged
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the only defense
that an interstate carrier can make is that proper appliances
were
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tion, or that the defective ap'pliance was not a contributory cause of the injury of the employee.
In the ca.se of Potter v. Los Angeles & 8. L. R. Q,o.,
42 Nev. 370, 177 Pac. 933, 934, the court granted plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's defense of contributory negligence, the plaintiff having based his claim
upon an alleged violation hy defendant of the Safety
Appliance Act. The court stated:

"* * * It .is clear from the complaint that
plaintiff, as a basis of recovery, relies upon the
negligence of the appellant in having a defective
automatic coupler upon the car which was being
switched. The allegation as to the sp·eed of the
car was, we take it, for the· pur'pose of showing
the necessity for plaintiff's jumping from a car
aft~er it had become uncoupled, and was not
pleaded as a cause of action. Conceding, for the
purpose of the case, that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence in jumping from the
car, it was only one of the concurring causes of
plaintiff's injury for the proximate cause was
the defective coupler, but for the defective
coupler, the cars would have· been under P'erfect eontrol, they would not have run at an
excessive rate of speed, and there would have
been no injury. We think the language .of the
court in Otos v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn.
283, 150 N.W. 9~2, is squarely in point. The court
said:
'' 'Defendant contends that the proximate
caus·e of plaintiff's injury was, not the defective
condition of the coupling, but his violation of a
rule of the employer forbidding employees going
between moving cars. It appears that there was
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such a rule. There is evidence that in this yard
it had, with the knowledge of the yardmaster,
been more honored in its breach than in its observance. But, 'vhatever may be said of the propriety of plaintiff's act in going between the cars,
it was only one of the concurring causes of plaintiff's injury. The violation of the statute was one
cause of his injury. Turrittin v. Chicago, St. P.,
~f. & 0. Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 408, 104 N.W. 225;
Sprague v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 104 Minn.
58, 116 N.W. 104. This is all that is necessary to
create liability. The statute which abolishes contributory negligence '' 'would be nullified by calling plaintiff's act the proximate cause, and then
defeating him, when he could not be defeated by
calling his act contributory negligence. * * • It
is only when plaintiff's act is the sole causewhen defendant's act is no part of the causation
-that defendant is free from liability under the
act.''' Grand ·Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42, 47, 34 Sup. Ct. 581, 582, 58 L.
Ed. 838, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 168, quoting 201 Fed.
844, 120 C.C.A. 166.' ''
Instruction No. 16 also contains what plaintiff
conceives to be a misconception of the evidence in that
the instruction states_ that Frank Lucus was in a position on the motorcar with his back toward the freight
trai:rrilllrl posing a hypothetical question for the jury to
consider as to whether or not Frank Lucus could have
manipulated the track car as well without his back being
toward the freight train. There .is abBolutely no evidence in the record that Mr. Lucus. was in a position on
the motor car where his b~ck was toward the freight
train.Sponsored
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ceeding in an easterly direction; that he was seated on
the south side, facing south, and that Mr. Lucus was
·seated on the north ·side, facing north (Tr. -19, 29).
The evidence was clear that both Lucus and Lynch were
looking to the west, but they were both seated on the
car in the normal and usual manner, i.e., they were
seated with their feet off the edge of the platform and
on a railing constructed around the outer edge of the
track car for the purpose of supporting the workmen's
feet. 'There is no evidence in the record any place that
the position of Frank Lucus on the motor car was an
unsafe or dangerous position.
It is obvious, of course, that the failure of Frank
Lucus to observe the stalled freight train some time
prior to the time the track car came into collision with
its rear was a contributing cause to his death, but it is
inconceivable that anyone could believe that the stalled
freight train was not also a contributing cause to the
death of Frank Lucus. The court refused plaintiff's
1 equested Instruction No. 4 which set forth in clear and
concise language this principle. Instead he instructed
in legal language which was well calculated to mislead
the jury into believing that under these circumstances
there was a sole proximate cause of the death of William
Frank Lucus.
We again call the Court's attention to the MC'Cartlvy
v. Pennsylvarn.ia R. Co., case, supra, and the decision of
the United State;s. Supreme Court in this case with full
assurance that this Court applying the standards set
down in those two cases can arrive at but one conclusion:
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That the trial court, in refusing plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. -!, in allowing the introduction of Exhibit
'· 3'' and in giving Instruction No. 16, all and each of
w·hich errors deprived plaintiff of his righto unde·r the
Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
We submit that the language and thought set forth
and contained in the opinion of Justice Black, written
for a unanimous court, is as crystal clear as he, declares
the statute to be. That court has stated for the guidance
and direction of this court and the trial court in this
caoe that the issues presented by the pleading and proof,
concern two matters, and two matters only: (1) was th~e
defendant guilty as it is admitted it was of a violation
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and (2) did that
violation contribute in whole or in part to the death of
deceased.
The trial court by its rulings in this caoe has either
intentionally disregarded the mandate of the Supreme
Court or has been incapable and unable to interpret and
apply the express direction. In either event the trial
court was guilty of groB.s and prejudicial error.
Edith B. Lucus, the widow of this deceased, is entitled to a fair trial of her cause under the law, and the
guiding interpretive decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States should make that law so clear and so
easy of understanding that any trial court in the State
of Utah could understand and be guided by it. It is
true Sponsored
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been as greatly damaged in the loss of her husband as
other widows whose matters have been brought to the
attention of this court, but that is of no moment here
in this case. Her rights. are just as great and juat as
sacred as though her husband had been constant and
faithful in his devotion to his family and she had been
the mother of numerous dependent children.
The Judge who tried this case has been clearly
informed and advised by the Supreme Court of the
United Statea, if such advice is necessary in view of the
"crystal clear" language of the act that contributory
negligence was not an issue in this case, but for the
benefit of the litigants here the trial judge has written
some new law and has not only made contributory negligence a partial, but a complete defense to this action.
Such apparent disregard of the law deserves the rebuke
of this court and should not he tolerated.
The recorda in this case will show that plaintiff exhausted his remedy to escape from the necessity of
trying this case before the Honorable John A. Hendricks,
and we pause at this time to call the court's, attention to
the contention we made at that time that it would be
impossible for Mrs. Lucus to obtain a fair and impartial
trial before Judge Hendricks, and we assert here now
that the record in this case shows that plaintiff was
entirely correct in that contention and that she not only
failed to receive a fair and impartial trial hut the law
of the case, as declared by the 'Supreme Court of the
United States, was entirely disregarded and the matter
tried and submitted to the jury without any attention
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paid to the Supreme Court of the United States, and on
issues 'vhich were not only eliminated by the Federal
Congress but were declared to be non-exisist'ent as matter of defense by the Supreme Court of the United
State B.
The only determination that counsel for the plaintiff
has ever had in this matter is· to obtain for Edith B.
Lucus a fair and impartial trial according to the law
and the testimony in this case, and although that determination has been tried and vigorously tested, it still
exists and will continue to exist until that end and aim
is fully realized.
We believe that a trial court's fir at duty is to apply
the law as it exists, not as the trial court feels it should
be, and we believe that when the Supreme Court of the
United States has outlined the law in language that
cannot be misunderstood by any intelligent consideration
of it, that a trial court commits error when it completely
and intentionally disregards the mandate of the Superior
Court, an·d we submit to this court that the record in
thia case establishes and supports these charges which
we have made, and which we will continue to make until
the doors of all courts in this country are closed against
us.
The contention of defendant that an 1ssue of sole
proximate cause is made is pure and simple subterfuge
and made for the purpose of breathing life into ·a dehaB· been expressly eliminated not only by
fenseSponsored
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the Federal Congress but the Supreme Court of the
United States in this ve·ry case.
POINT II.
THE OOURT'S REFUSAL AND F AlLURE TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AND INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID IN INSTRUCTION
NO. 9 CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. (Assignment
of Errors 4 and 5.)

The evidence presented on the dependency and
reasonable expectation of Mrs. Lucus for support from
Frank Lucus demonstrated beyond any possible doubt
that Frank Lucus did not at the time of his death intend
to voluntarily support ~1rs. Lucus. Reference to defendant's Exhibit "2" will demonstrate that Mrs. Lucus
did not believe that she could voluntarily get support
from Frank Lucus. However, Mrs. Lucus had an adjudication of her right to support from Frank Lucus and
that adjudication by the California Court continued in
force to the date of Frank Lucus' death. In light of this
evidence plaintiff requested Instruction No. 11 a.s :follows (J.R. 208):
''You are instructed that the marriage relation creates a right on the p·art of the wife to
be supported by her husband and this right may
be legally enforced by her so long as the marriage
relation exists, and if the said Edith B. Lucus
is entitled to recover damages under these instructions she cannot be deprived of that right
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by a. plea on the part of defendant that her husband had not fulfilled the duties he ow-ed to her.
·'In thi:s connection you are instructed that
if you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover
dru.11ages in this case then in determining the loss
of pecuniary benefits mentioned in Instruction
No. ____________ (here insert the number of the Court's
instruction which corresponds with 'plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 10). You may take
into consideration not only such voluntary contributions as William Frank Lucus may reasonably have been expected to make to Edith B.
Lucus during her lifetime but also such contributions as she may reasonably have been expected
to secure through the enforcement of her legal
right to support from her husband.''
The request was refused and the court gave no
instruction concerning the right of Edith Lucus to force
Frank Lucus to suppoTt her. Instead he gave the following Instruction No. 9 ( J.R. 210) :
''You are instructed that the mere fact that
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence
to prove that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
any damages for his death in this action. If you
believe from all the evidence in the case that the
deceased would not have made any further money
contributions to Edith Lucua or would not have
supported her in the future if he had not died,
then your verdict should be for the defendant.''
This Court had a similar problem before it in Llewelyn v. lndtustrial Commission et ~al., 202 P. (2d) 160.
, ChiefSponsored
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rights of a wife under a Utah se~parate maintenance
decree. It is long established law in Utah that where
there is no evidence on foreign law, that law will be
presumed to be the same as the law of Utah. Smith v.
Smith, 77 Utah 60,291 P. 2'98, at 300:
''First. Was the decree entered in the divorce
suit res adjudicata of the matter sought to be
litigated in the suit at bar~ The evidence/ adduced
at the trial clearly showed that, by reason of the
divorce action, the North Dakota court had before
it the question of the division of the p·roperty of
the parties. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 3000,
provides that, in actions for divorce, 'the court
may make such order in relation to the children,
property, parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children as shall be equitable. ' In
the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is
presumed that the law of North Dakota is to the
same effect. Am. Oak Leather Co. v. Union Bank,
9 Utah 87, 33 P. 246; Dickson v. Mullings, 66
Utah 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R. 136. ''
To the same effect see Shurtliff v. Oregon Sho!rt
LineR. Co., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1.058; Grow v. 0. S. L. R.
Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398.
In the Llew~elyn case, supra, Chief Justice Pratt
made the following statement concerning the right to
involuntary support:
"In the case of Utah Ap·ex Mining Co. v.
Industrial Commission (66 ·Utah 529, 244 P. 658)
cited above, this court discusses, inter alia, the
·probability of the wife, in the future, obtaining
support from the huohand either 'voluntarily or
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involuntarily.' Obviously, in the p.resent case the
support would not, in the future, have been voluntarily given; but certainly the chances of acquiring involuntary support from the deceased
would have met with little difficulty where the
status of dependency has been adjudicated and
the husband is capable of supporting his wife.
There is a distinct and reasonable probability
that the obligation of ·support under such a decree would be satisfied by direction of the court.
The separate maintenance decree is evidentiary
of the fact that the wife is rightly living separate
and apart from the husband through no fault
of her own, but is entitled to support.''
The Supreme Court of the Unite·d States in a landmalk case, Michiga;n Central R. Go. v. v.reeland, 227
U. S. 59, 33 S. Ct. 192, 196, 57 L. Ed. 417, set forth the
rule under Federal Employers' Liability Act cases as
follows:
''The distinguishing features of that act are
identical with the act of Congress of 1908 before
its amendment : First, it is grounded upon the
original wrongful injury of the person; second,
it is for the exclusive benefit of certain specified
relatives ; third, the damages are such as flow
from the dep-rivation of the pecuniary benefits
which the beneficiaries. might have reasonably
received if the deceaaed had not died from his
injuries.''
New 0ff'leans & N. E. R. Co. v. Barris, 247 U.S.
367, 38 S. Ct. 535, 536, 62 L. Ed. 1167, concerned a suit
under the Act by deceased's mother. The widow who
had lived
with
the
deceased
for
only
six
months
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abouts was unknown. There was no indication that a
divorce proceeding· had been commenced. The Supreme
Court refused to allow the mother to participate as a
dep·endent under the act, and stated as follows:
''The act makes the widow ·sole beneficiary
when there is no child and only in the absence
of both may parents be considered. The deceased
left a widow and although they had lived apart
no claim is made that rights and liabilities consequent upon marriage had disappeared under
local law. Of course, we do not go beyond the
particular facts here disclos,ed. In the circumstances, proof of the mothe'r '·s p·ecuniary loss
could not support a recovery.''
'H.ee also Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
U.S. 525, 38 S. Ct. 379, 62 L. Ed. 867.

Hollow~ay,

246

Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 267 F. 376, 381, (Cert.
den. 254 U. 'S.. 646, 41 S. Ct. 15, 65 L. Ed. 455), concerned
facts similar to those in the present case. The court
made the following statement:
''The court was asked to rule that only nominal damages could be recovered, because Miller
and his wife had separated ·soon after their marriage, and he had not thereafter contributed to
her support. But there had been no divorce, and
nothing appears to show that she might not at
any time have enforced he·r conjugal rights under
the laws of Virginia. This being so, she was entitled to substantial damages, if the jury found
in her favor, as seems to be ·plainly held by the
Supreme Court in New Orlean-B. & N. E. R. Co.
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Harris, 2-± 7 U. S. 367, 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 535,
G2 L. Ed. 1167. ''

Y.

See also
186 F. 175.

D~tnba·r

v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. CiO'.,

The state decisions holding that under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act a widow is entitled to have the
jury consider the involuntary as well as the voluntary
contributions which she might reasonably expect, are
numerous and without conflict.
In Foga.rty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 85 Wash. 90,
147 P. 652, 653, there was evidence tending to show
that the deceas-ed railroad employee had abandoned his
wife and child about five years before he was killed and
since his abandonment had contributed practically nothing to their support. The evidence ~so indicated that
the widow had been searching for her husband since his
abandonment. On these two facts the Foganty case is
directly in point. The deceased in the Fogarty case also
stated to persons that he had permanently ahand·oned
his wife and he repudiated his paternity of the child
which she had horne. Neither spouse had ever secured
a divorce. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs and apportioned it between the widow and
child. In discussing the case the court stated:
"The appellant's argument is directed to
two contentions: (1) That the undisputed evidence shows that neither the widow nor the minor
child had any reasonable expectation of ever reSponsored
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ceased; ·(2) that in any event the widow had
forfeited all right to any assistance or support.
"1. It is now thoroughly settled that the
federal Employers' Liability Act in its essentials
follows the first English law on the subject, that
of 9 and 10 Victoria, known as Lord Campbell's
act, and must be construed as that act has been
-construed, not as a mere continuance of the right
of the injured employe in favor of his estate, but
a.s granting a new and independent cause of action
for the benefit of the dependent relatives named
in the statute, and that the damages recoverable
are limited to the financial loss su·stained by their
being deprived of a reasonable expectation of
p·ecuniary benefit hy the wrongful death. Mich.
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 :Sup.
Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176;
American R. R. Co. of Porto Rico v. Didricksen,
227 U. S. 145, 33 Sup. Ct. 224, 57 L. Ed. 456;
Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228
U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426, 57 L. Ed. 785.
"In its final analysis, the appellant's argument is reduced to the claim that in case of
abandonment the jury should not he permitted
to speculate upon the possibility of a reconciliation. It ignores the legally enforceable liability
of a hu·sband and father to support his wife and
child to the extent of his reasonable ability.''

*

*

* *
''If, therefore, in addition to the legal liability, there was shown an earning power and
capacity of the deceased, such that, had he lived,
the legal right t.o p,ecuniary assistance or support
might have been enforced as a thing real and
measurable, pecuniarily valuable, then it cannot
be said, as a matter of law, that there was no
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reasonable expectation of such assistance or support, even though it had not theretofore been
Yoluntarily given. Such legal liability accompanied by proof of ability of the deceased to
have met the legal duty also meets the other
requisite read into the act by the United States
Supreme Court in the \Treeland decision in defining 'the pecuniary loss and damage' as 'one
which can be measured by some standard.' The
legally enforceable liability and the actual ability
of the deceased to have met it furnishes a ·standard of measurement pecuniary in its nature, just
as would be furnished by the antecedent voluntary performance of the legal duty. ·To hold
otherwise would be to hold the right to enforce
assistance or support by the wife and child a
thing of no pecuniary value. This, so far as we
are advised, no court has ever held.''
The same legal p-rinciple is set forth in Gilliam v.
S·outhern Ry. Co., 108 ~s. C.195, 93 S. E. 865, 86-6:

'' * * * Some 16 or 18 years before, McBride
married the woman, and had by her the child
for whose benefit the action was brought. After
living with his wife about a year, he abandoned
her and his child. There was no evidence that
he afterwards contributed anything to the sup""
port of either of them; nor was there any evidence that he did not, except as that was inferable from the fact that he had not lived with
them or communicated with them. ·There was evidence that, after he abandoned her, his wife lived
in the house with another man, and that she had
another child.''

•

•

*

•
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"t:

·~

* Defendant moved f.or a directed verdict on two grounds, which are renewed here.
The first is that there was no evidence that the
beneficial plaintiffs sustained any actual pecuniary loss. by the death of McBride; and the second
is that, as his death was instantaneous, there was
no survival of the right of action for his pain
and suffering.
'' A·s to the first ground, the motion was properly refused. The law imposes upon every man
the duty of supporting his wife and minor unmarried children; and, in this state, any ablebodied man who, without just cause or excuse,
ab·andons or fails to supply the actual necessaries
of life to his wif·e or to his minor unmarried
child or ·children dependent upon him, is. guilty
of a misdemeanor. Crim. Code, Sec. 697; State
v. English, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721, L.R.A.
1915F, 977. Therefore, prima facie and p~resump
tively, the widow and minor unmartied child of
deceased had a legal pecuniary interest in the
continuance of his life. The fact that he had
abandoned them and had failed to perform the
duty impoB.ed upon him by the law did not absolve
him from the oblig~tion, nor deprive them of the
right to have it enforced. The evidence did not
warrant the court in holding, as matter of law,
that the wife had forfeited her right of support
by her -conduct. As to that, the evidence made
an issue for the jury, under prop·er instructions.
Besides, there was no evidence that the right
of the child, if ·she then was, or should thereafter
during minority become, depen.dent was not still
existent; and the action was brought for her benefit as well as the wife's.
''When the relation between deceased and
the beneficial plaintiff is that of husband and
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"~ife

or parent and 1ninor child, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, actual pecunial'y loss
""'ill be presumed from the death. Minneapolis
& St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S.
66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 9·95 ; Ingersoll v.
Detroit, etc., Railroad Co., 163 Mich. 268, 128
N. W. 227, 32 L.R.A. (N. S.) 362; Fogarty v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 74 Waah. 397,
133 Pac. 609, L.R.A. 1916C, 800; note in L.R.A.
1916E, 127, 144, 148."

Davis' Adm'r et al. v. C·incinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry.
Co., 172 Ky. 55, 188 S. W. 1061, 1063, is a case which
indicates that it was error for the trial judge to leave
to the jury the question of whether or not a dependent
child had any right to expect pecuniary benefit from her
deceased father. The Kentucky court pointed out that
the right of a child for support from her father was a
right which could be adjusted to accommodate the needs
of the child and the ability of the father to pay. That
principle is, of course, applicable in the present case for
Mrs. Lucus could certainly, if the need arose, insist on
an adjustment upward of the decree of the California
court providing Frank Lucus could afford to pay an
increase in the support money. The Kentucky court in
the Davis case, discussing this principle, stated as follows:

'' * * * By the judgment of divorce the wife
was given the custody of the child, and the ·deceas-ed, who was the defendant in that suit, was
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adjudged and ordered to pay his wife the sum
of $300 in support of their infant child. This sum
he was nrdered to pay in installments of $25
every three months. There is nothing said in the
judgment indicating that this is .the only sum
which he will ever be called upon to pay in support of his child, and that it is a well-known rule
of law in this· ·state that such judgments may he
opened up at any tinie, by ap:p:ropriate proceedings, and additional allowances made, if the proof
on such proceedings justifies it. Mor·eover, the
child was not a party to that .p:roceeding, and
the judgment ordering the allowance is by no
means binding on it. Notwithstanding thes-e facts,
the defendant was permitted: to· introduce the
judgmen.t and read. -it· to .the jury upon the trial,
over the objections of the phiintiff. We think this
serious error~ A·s we shall hereafter see, the
child, as a dependent upon its father, was ~ntitled .
to recover the pecuniary benefits, which, as mani~
fes.ted by the proof, it had a right ·to expect from
its father, who wa·s under a· legal obligation to
support and supply it with necessities during.its
infancy, and these benefits cannot in the l,ea·.st be
augmented or .diminished by a jud~ent in a collateral procee.ding to which the person entitled to
them was in no sense a pnrty. · Whatever effect
the judgment might have. as between the husband
and. wife in regard to any sums w4ich he might
be adjudged to pay her ..cannot affect the rights
of the chi~d: which it may have in the continued
life of its father._ We, th'erefore, think that the
objections of plaintiff, in this particular, are well
· taken.''
·

The principle, o_f. :.the right to involuntary contributions from a person . . having a legal' duty .to support ha.s.
{,

·.....

. -~
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been recognized and applied for a great number of ·
years. In Ingersoll v. D-etroit & llJ. Ry. Co., 163 Mich.

' T·

268, 128 N.
22·7, 229, the court had before it a case
wherein the trial court judge had directed a verdict
against plaintiff after counsel's opening statement. In
discussing the facts, the court set them down as follows:

'' * * * It appears that the marriage was lawful
that the child was born as a result of such marriage, that at the time the deceased was injured
and died the wife did not know where he was,
and that he had never contributed anything to
her support nor that of the child. The plaintiff
contends that contributions of a husband and
father may be voluntary, or they may be forced;
that the law would compel decedent to contribute
to the widow during her life, and to the child during its minority; that by death she and the child
lost this resource which the law gives, whether
it waa a voluntary, or an involuntary, contribution; that the common and statute law -of Minnesota, where the marriage took place, of Wisconsin, where the widow and child resided at the
time of the death, and of this state, where the
death took place, would compel the decedent to
support his wife and child; and that this furnishes
a basis on which damages may be asses·s.ed hy the
jury, just as the court could assess 'damages, or
fix liability, against decedent, had he been arraigned before it for a failure to contribute to
their support. The defendant urges that no basis
for damagea was furnished in the opening statement of counsel; that the wife and child had no
reason to expect the husband and father to contribute to their support; that damages must be
proved by the circumstances, by capacity to earn,
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and by disposition to contribute pecuniarily to
the aid.''
It then proceeded to discuss in a scholarly fashion
the law concerning the involuntary contributions as the
basis for assessing damages. On this subject it states:
"It is urged by defendant that there was no
basis for assessing damages. Had decedent been
proceeded against to compel him to support his
wife and child, the same difficulty would have
been encountered; and yet we think the court
would have had no difficulty after learning all
of the facts to fix a reasonable basis from which
to determine the amount. Had this man been
killed by a negligent act, an hour after his marriage, and before he had ever contributed a cent
to the support of his wife, would it be contended
that she had not suffered pecuniary loss thereby~
It would seem not. What would be the basis of
assessing damages in such a case~ We think
that they would be determined by showing the
circum·stances, and by evidence of the probabilities, under proper rules, as in suits brought by
parents to recover damages in case of the negligent death of a young. child, who had never earned
a dollar. Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 74 Mich.
20, 41 N. W. 847. In this case it app.ears that the
husband had abandoned his wife through no
fault of hers.
"Similar questions have been before the
courts of other states. In 6 Thompson's Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, at section
7054, the rule is stated as follows: 'The widow
is not prevented from maintaining an action for
the death of her husband by negligence, by the
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fact that she is living in ·aeparation from him,
unless she has forfeited the right to support from
him by leading an abandoned life. Nor will a
child be prevented from recovering for the death
of his father by the fact that the father had lived
away from him for many years, and had not contributed anything to the support of his wife or
child'.''
"Under the circumstances of this case should
not the question of what, if any sum, might the
widow and child, be reasonably expected to receive from the deceased, have been submitted to
the jury~ Can it be said as matter of law that
the wife would never learn the whereabouts of
he·r husband and proceed against him for sup·port?''
·The court cites s.everal cases in support of its
opinion. Two of particular interest are: D·allas· R. C;o.
v. Spieker, 61 Tex. 427, 48 Am. Rep~. 297, and B. & 0.
R. Co. v. State, for Use of Chambers, 81 Md. 371, 32
Atl. 201. It then conclu'ded that the circuit court ·should
have permitted the jury to determine the liability of
defendant and assess plaintiff's damages for contributions voluntary or forced that would probably have been
made by deceased in favor of the widow during her
probable life, if not exceeding the probable life of decedent and for the child during its mino.rity.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11 was in all
respects a prop·er and accurate application of the law
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of the United States and the State of Ultah to the evih
dence before the jury. It was an instruction to which
Plaintiff ag matter of law was entitled. The court not
only refused plaintiff's instruction but failed and neglected to instruct the jury in any way that Edith Lucus
was entitled to involuntary contributions from Frank
Lucus. This right to involuntary contributions is beyond
possible doubt. In our res·earch we have failed to find
any case which holds that involuntary contributions
should not be considered in assessing the damages to
a widow, and we feel confident that there will he no
authority cited by defendant which will so indicate.
Mrs. Lucus was confident that her husband would
return to her. She in no way abandoned her claim for
support from him, searching diligently for him, and
making numerous inquiries in an attempt to discover
his whereabouts. The failure of the court to instruct
the jury that Mrs. Lucus was entitled to involuntary
contributiori·a left the jury without any information concerning that valuable right. We submit that the failure
and refusal by the court to instruct on the right to involuntary contributions when considered together with
Instruction No. 9 ( J.R. 210) _,'that the mere fact that
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus 'at the
time of his death is not sufficient evidence to prove that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages for his
'death in this action,'' is gross and p~rejudicial · error
depriving Edith Lucus. of her most valuable right.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the trial court committed
grievous prejudicial errors, both of omission and commission in his instructions and in the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence, and plaintiff should be
granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK
& ROBERTS,
DWIGHT L. KING,
Attorneys for Plaintiff amd
App.elZoot.
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